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I.

ADMIRAL DISREGARDS PLED FACTS POTENTIALLY REQUIRING
DEFENSE DUTY
A.

Claimants' Allegations of Akavar Purchases, Not its Use, and
Resulting Damages Trigger Coverage

Admiral's defense duty is determined by considering not just the limited fact
allegations that Admiral likes but all facts pled. "If one claim or allegation triggers the
duty to defend, the insurer must defend all claims (that is, covered and non-covered
claims)... When in doubt, defend." (emphasis added) Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cloud
Nine, LLC, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1166 (D. Utah 2006), citing Benjamin v. Amica Mut.
Ins. Co., 140 P.3d 1210, 1216 (Utah 2006).
Admiral spotlights some carefully-culled underlying allegations that the
representative plaintiffs used Akavar but did not lose weight. Admiral then asserts
plaintiffs seek remedies based solely on their use of Akavar and failure to lose weight,
not their purchases prompted by Basic Research's advertisements. [Appellee's Brief
("AB"), pp. 8-10] But other allegations in Miller, Tompkins and Forlenza assert that the
representative plaintiffs and class members purchased Akavar in reliance on the
statements ("Eat All You Want and Still Lose Weight") in Basic Research's
advertisements and plaintiffs seek damages resulting from the purchases - not from
product use. [Opening Brief ("OB"), pp. 8-10]
By disregarding these other allegations Admiral reveals that it "can't handle the
truth." The disregarded allegations confirm that the underlying lawsuits are about
advertising, not breach of warranty. Since claimants' "injury" (paying money to
purchase Akavar) allegedly "arose out o f Basic Research's alleged "use of another's

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

[Western Holdings'] advertising idea in [their] 'advertisement,'" inducing those
purchases, potential coverage is implicated and Admiral's defense duty triggered.
Admiral's focus on an isolated allegation that the representative plaintiff tried
Akavar but did not lose weight [AB 8-9] incorrectly implies no other facts meeting
Benjamin's "one . . . allegation" requirement are pled. As previously noted [OB 6-10;
Record on Appeal ("R") 803-805, 901, 1026-1027, 1032-1033, 1035-1036], the Miller,
Tompkins and Forlenza complaints contain facts squarely meeting Benjamin's "one . . .
allegation" requirement.
Miller seeks certification of a plaintiff class consisting of "all persons or entities
who or that purchased [Akavar] within the United States" (emphasis added), with no
requirement that class members "used" Akavar. [R 827] "Entity" class membership
requires only Akavar's purchase, not use, because "entities" cannot "use" Akavar [R 827]
as they cannot swallow diet supplements and have no weight to lose.
Nor does Admiral consider that the Tompkins' class representatives represent
those "who purchased, not for sale or reassignment, [Akavar] [R 918-919]... [and]
suffered injury as a result." [R 919] (emphasis added). Again, the consolidated
Miller/Tompkins classes were certified with no "use" requirement: "Persons who
purchased Akavar." Miller v. Basic Research, LLC, No. 2:07-CV-871 TS, 2011 WL
818150 at *2 (D. Utah March 2, 2010).
Admiral also disregards Forlenza's allegations that representative plaintiffs
Forlenza, Monroe and "I. Bodor" "purchased" Akavar in reliance on the same
advertisements alleged in Miller and Tompkins [R 1014-1015, 1017], and that "I. Bodor"
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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seeks certification of a plaintiff class "who purchased [Akavar]" (emphasis added)
excluding Miller and Tompkins class members. [R 1023-1024] Here too, there is no
"use" requirement.
B.

Claimants Allege Class "Damages" Resulting Only from Akavar
Purchases, Not from its Use

The Miller, Tompkins and Forlenza allegations fall squarely within Admiral's
obligation to pay "damages" because of "personal and advertising injury," defined as
"injury . . . arising out o f an enumerated offense. [R 37, 47, 97] These elements are met
[OB 18-21], triggering potential coverage and Admiral's defense duty. Cloud Nine, 464
F.Supp.2d at 1166; Sharon Steel Corp, v. Aetna Cas, & Sur, Co,, 931 P.2d 127, 133 (Utah
1997). Admiral has not and cannot meet its burden of "establishing] that" all of the
underlying "claims fall outside the coverage of the policy . . . , " Simmons v. Farmers Ins,
Group, 877 P.2d 1255, 1258, n.3 (Utah App. 1994).
Contending the underlying complaints allege damages caused by Akavar's failure
to perform as advertised, Admiral disregards that the complaints seek damages resulting
from purchases in reliance on advertisements, not from product use and failure to
perform. Nor can Admiral do so because the underlying complaints meet Benjamin's
"one . . . allegation" test. Miller seeks damages for violations of Utah's Consumer Sales
Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. §13-11-1 et seq. and similar out of state statutes, and for
"negligent misrepresentation." [R 843-848, 850-851] "As a result of Defendants' . . .
negligent statements . . . Plaintiffs and the members of the Class have been injured
and have suffered loss of money and property, and they are entitled to recover
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damages[.]" [R 846, 850-851, 853] (emphasis added)
Tompkins also alleges plaintiffs and class members' entitlement to "damages"
under California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA") (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750 et
seq.) which permits an award of "damages" in addition to the "restitution" remedy the
claimants separately seek under Cal. Bus. & Profs. Code § 17200 et seq. [R 925] These
allegations contradict Admiral's attempted conflation of covered "damages" and
"restitution" remedies as described below in detail. See Section II.B.2.
In Forlenza the plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and "I. Bodor" allege they
"purchased" Akavar in reliance on the same advertisements alleged in Miller and
Tompkins. [R 1014-1015, 1017] The Forlenza claimants seek both "individual damages"
[R 1018] and damages on behalf of a plaintiff class of "all citizens of California only who
purchased [Akavar]" but excluding Miller and Tompkins class members. [R 1023-1024]
Like Miller and Tompkins, Forlenza does not require "product use" as a class
membership requirement. Like Tompkins, Forlenza seeks CLRA "damages" for
plaintiffs and the class in addition to a distinct "restitution" remedy for other claims. [R
1029,1038]
Only Ms. Forlenza, individually, alleges damages "because she purchased a
product based on false advertising and because the product has not worked as
advertised." [R 1014-1015] (emphasis added) But the latter allegation does not
eliminate the former allegation as Ms. Forlenza seeks damages based, in part, on
purchases inspired by allegedly misleading advertisements.
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This Court can conclude as Admiral urges only by disregarding the underlying
allegations that refute Admiral's arguments. Doing so improperly permits Admiral to
"cobble together the most favorable allegations from both parties and disregard the
rest[.]" Align Tech., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 673 F. Supp. 2d 957, 972 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
C.

The Trial Court, Misled by Admiral, Erroneously Presumed All
Claimants used Akavar Products

The trial court accepted Admiral's mischaracterizations without citing the
underlying complaints' pertinent language. But the above-referenced allegations prove
the trial court wrong, as its "no potential coverage" ruling was premised on the same
disregard of facts that Admiral now urges. Benjamin and Cloud Nine prohibit such a
blatant disregard of the facts.
II.

ADMIRAL
MISCHARACTERIZES
THE
LEGAL
DOCTRINES
ESTABLISHING POTENTIAL COVERAGE UNDER ITS POLICY
A,

Admiral Asserts a "Causation" Requirement Based on the Policy
Term "Arising Out Of," Which Does Not Require "Proximate
Causation"

Admiral claims it only provides coverage where "the insured committed one of the
defined offenses which is asserted to be the cause of the insured's liability for damages."
[AB 21, 39] Here, Admiral inaccurately paraphrases the Policy language. It contains no
requirement of "proximate causation" between a covered "offense" and "damages." The
word "liability" does not even appear in the coverage language. Instead, the Policy
requires only that Admiral pay "damages because of 'personal and advertising injury,5"
defined as: "injury . . . arising out of one or more of the following offenses . . .
[including] f. The use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement.'" [R 47]
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(emphasis added).
Under Utah law, "arising out o f does not require direct proximate causation. Its
meaning is broader, including: "originating from," "growing out of," "flowing from,"
"incident to" or "connected with." Durbano v. American Empire Ins., No. 91-4225, 914142, 1992 WL 112246 at *2 (10th Cir. (Utah) 1992) (unpublished), citing Nat'I Farmers
Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 577 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1978)
(cited by Admiral). The Policy does not require a heightened causal link between the
offense (f) and "damages." Instead, "injury" (claimants' payment of money) need only
"arise out o f offense (f).
Miller, Tompkins and Forlenza meet this requirement by alleging their plaintiffs'
and class members' purchases "arose out o f (i.e., "originated from" or "flowed from")
Basic Research's "advertisement," whose "advertising idea" originated with "another"
(Western Holdings or others identified by the Federal Trade Commission). [OB 31-39]
No other causal nexus need be alleged to trigger potential coverage.
False advertising is injurious to potential consumers of a product that has been
misrepresented whether or not the consumers actually use it. The mere purchase of
Akavar, inspired by an "advertising idea" "used" in Basic Research's "advertisement," is
a wasted expenditure constituting "injury," and supporting an award of damages.
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B.

"Damages" Is a Remedy "Because of'Advertising Injury'"
1.

The Theory of Recovery Does Not Require Proximate Cause
Analysis

Bank of the West v. Sup. Ct9 2 Cal.4th 1254 (1992) does not support Admiral's
construction but clarifies why Basic Research's analysis rings true. The Court held at
1264:
[T]he policy . . . covers "damages" for "advertising injury"
caused by "unfair competition." Read in this context, the
term "unfair competition" can only refer to a civil wrong that
can support an award of damages.
Here, the operative offense is "use of another's advertising idea in your
'advertisement,' " not "unfair competition." The underlying false advertising claims
assert civil wrongs that support a damage award. Nothing more need be shown to
establish why the "as damages because of 'advertising injury' " provision is satisfied. [R
851,922,1014-1015]
The underlying complaints all assert express claims for recovery of damages based
on "false advertising." The focus is not on the theory of recovery but on the facts pled
which meet the offense's elements. Butler v. Clarendon Am. Ins. Co., 494 F. Supp. 2d
1112, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("Coverage is triggered by the offense, not the injury or
damage which a plaintiff suffers . . . [for] 'advertising injury liability.'").
2.

The Damages Remedy Is Not Altered By Measurement as
Money Paid, Nor is the Damage Amount So Limited

Confronted with Miller's, Thompson's and Forlenza 's allegations of and prayers
for "damages," Admiral wrongly characterizes the sole remedy sought as non-covered
purchase price "restitution." [AB 42-43] Not so. The complaints seek "damages" and,
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separately, "restitution" as different remedies with entitlement to each triggered by
Akavar purchases, not use. (Again, the entity class member purchasers cannot use
Akavar.) [R 827, 919, 1014-1015, 1023-1024] The purchases allegedly were prompted
by advertised claims that purportedly cannot be true for anybody - not by claims proved
untrue on a purchaser-by-purchaser basis. Otherwise the classes would exclude
purchasers who did not use Akavar and thus cannot know whether it works for them.
Damages, no matter how measured, are a distinct remedy allowed by state "false
advertising" statutes pled in the underlying suits. See, California Legal Remedies Act
("CLRA"), Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(a) (remedies include "actual damages" not less than
$1,000 in class actions and, separately, "restitution of property.") It matters not that
"damages" can be calculated as sums the class members paid for Akavar. The character
of a "damages" remedy is not altered by its calculation. Delarosa v. Boiron, Inc., 275
F.R.D. 582, 592 (CD. Cal. 2011) (if damage sum is limited to amount spent to purchase
falsely advertised product "the amount of restitution under the UCL and actual damages
under the CLRA is the same.") Admiral neither argues nor proves otherwise.
Regardless, CLRA damages need not equal restitution amounts. They may be as little as
$1,000 for the entire class (Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(a)(1); Delarosa, 275 F.R.D. at 593) or,
for seniors sustaining "substantial physical, emotional or economic damages," as much as
an additional $5,000 apiece. Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(b).
C.

Noscitur a Sociis Does Not Limit the Meaning of "Use of Another's"

Admiral's reliance on the noscitur a sociis doctrine as a reason to impose a strict
proximate cause standard is likewise unpersuasive. The proximity of offense (f), "use of
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another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement' " to other separate offenses such as (g),
"infringement upon another's . .. slogan," in no way alters the meaning of "use of
another's." Admiral does not argue otherwise but nonetheless tries to invoke the doctrine
to argue that just as its "liability" to an insured sued for false arrest depends on
allegations of proximate causation between damages and "false arrest," so too does
Admiral's "liability" to Basic Research depend on allegations of proximate causation
between damages and the "use of another's" offense. [AB 19-21] However, the separate
offenses do not imply a specific strict proximate cause standard for all offenses.
Additionally, while noscitur a sociis may assist in construing the meaning of an
ambiguous insurance policy term with reference to other terms immediately surrounding
it, ambiguity must be found. Heathman v. Giles, 374 P.2d 839, 840 (Utah 1962) (the rule
"requires that the meaning of doubtful rules or phrases be determined and take their
character from associated words or phrases"). Admiral neither argues that its "use of
another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement' " offense is ambiguous nor suggests
any alternative meaning based on the other "personal and advertising injury" offenses
surrounding it.
Applied Bolting Tech. Products v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 942 F. Supp. 1029,
1033, n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (applying Vermont law), cited by Admiral, also is not on point.
There, the district court ruled the "misappropriation of advertising ideas" offense (not at
issue here) was not triggered by a competitor's allegation that the insured had falsely
advertised that its product complied with industry standards. "Advertising idea" was held
not to include such industry standards. In dictum the Admiral-cited footnote contained a
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throwaway reference to noscitur a sociis without discussion or direct application of the
facts.
Applied Bolting's narrow construction of "advertising idea" is also inconsistent
with subsequent opinions applying Utah law. In Cloud Nine, supra, 464 F. Supp. 2d at
1166, an "advertising idea" was held, pursuant to prior authority, to be an "idea for
calling public attention to a product or business, especially by proclaiming desirable
qualities so as to increase sales or patronage." Judge Campbell determined that false
advertising allegations implicate coverage for deceptive trade practice claims under Utah
Code Ann. §13-1 la-3. Id. at 1169 {citing Elcom Technologies, Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Co.
of the Midwest, 991 F. Supp. 1294, 1298 (D. Utah 1997), reaching the same result in a
false advertising case).
D.

The Policy Term "Of' Imposes No Claimant Ownership Limit on the
"Advertising Idea"

Admiral's arguments are all based on the "straw man" premise that the Policy
contains a requirement of proximate causation between "damages" and an offense
(whether "false arrest" or "infringement upon another's copyright"). For the reasons
argued above and elsewhere [OB 18-21] Admiral's premise is inaccurate, because
"[ajrising out o f does not require proximate causation.
As stated in Amco Ins. Co. v. Lauren-Spencer, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 721, 733
(S.D. Ohio 2007):
Both the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals have interpreted the "arising out o f
language as requiring the advertising to materially contribute
to the injury of creating consumer confusion. But the
advertisement does not need to be the only cause of the injury
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to trigger the duty to defend. . . . The phrase indicates a
requirement of a causal relationship but not one of proximate
cause.
Contrary to Admiral's arguments, the Policy neither provides nor implicitly
contemplates that claimants must be "offended" by the "use of another's advertising
idea." The component elements of "offense (f)" are not defined in the Policy nor
circumscribed by the limited, flawed construction that Admiral asserts (aside from the
term "advertisement" whose satisfaction is not contested). Admiral's policy construction
is based on the same "inherent in the policy" argument that the Ninth Circuit recently
rejected, concluding: "[n]othing in the relevant provision or Kelley's policy as a whole
required that the allegedly injurious 'course of advertising' be undertaken by Kelley
itself." Tom Kelley Studios, Inc. v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co,, No. 10-55931, 2011 WL
6396441, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 2011).
Another state Supreme Court agrees. In McCormack Baron Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v.
American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 989 S.W.2d 168,171-72, 173 (Mo. 1999) the Missouri
Supreme Court held:
The word "offense" cannot be read to limit coverage only to a
articular "cause of action" or "claim." [It] simply does not
ave this meaning in either common usage or legal usage. . . .
Coverage could be limited to specific and formal causes of
action. . . . Additional cases from other jurisdictions generally
support a broad interpretation of the term "offenses" in
policies like the one involved here.

E

Here as in Kelley, 2011 WL 6396441, at *1: "[A]t most, the policy language on
this point is ambiguous because it is 'susceptible to two or more reasonable
constructions.'"
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E.

Basic Research's Alleged "Use" of Western Holdings' "Advertising
Ideas" Triggers a Policy "Offense"

Admiral neither contests the Utah law definitions of "of another" that Basic
Research posits nor explains why an alleged consumer harm is insufficient to trigger
possible coverage. What is pled suffices to constitute a "use of advertising idea" that
results in possible harm, as found in Cloud Nine, 464 F. Supp. at 1167, and General Cas
Co. of Wis. v. Wozniak Travel Inc., 762 N.W.2d 572, 579 (Minn. 2009).
Westfield Ins. Co. v. Robinson Outdoors, Inc., No. 10-151 (JRT/JJG), 2011 WL
5593171 (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 2011), now on appeal, is inconsistent with the Ninth
Circuit's Kelley approach noted supra. That district court failed to explain how a distinct
corporate party to a license arrangement with the insured would not be "of another."
This is especially problematic because the phrase "of another" can mean "a
different one." " O f is defined as "7. used to indicate possession, connection or
association." RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1343 (2d ed. 1993).
"Another" is defined as "5. a different one; someone different." Id. at 85. the word " o f
does not limit rights to an "ownership" harm but includes "association" or "connection."
Misconstruing the "use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement'"
offense by narrowly substituting the phrase "wrongful taking" in contravention of the
majority interpretation of "advertising idea" (as well as that adopted by Judge Campbell
in Cloud Nine), Robinson failed to perceive that "of another" can be a distinct entity
whose very legal separateness required the license agreement to confirm its rights.
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Here, Western Holdings is owned by an entity separate from Basic Research,
requiring an arms-length license agreement with Basic Research permitting its use of the
trademarked slogans in its "advertisements." [R 670, 808]
III.

ADMIRAL'S COVERAGE CASES ARE READILY DISTINGUISHABLE
A.

Admiral Cites No Coverage Case Analyzing False Advertising Claims
under Offense (f)

Trailer Bridge, Inc. v. Illinois National Ins. Co., 657 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. (Fla.)
2011) and Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 662 F.3d 765, 2011 WL 5313818
(7th Cir. (Ind.) 2011) analyzed claims labeled "antitrust," not claims for "false
advertising," triggering a defense under Policy offense (f) - "use of another's advertising
idea in your 'advertisement.' " Their analysis of offense (f)'s scope is inconsistent with
Utah law and not persuasive authority. Simmons v. Farmers Ins. Group, 877 P.2d 1255,
1258 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("language limiting an insurer's duty to defend an insured
must be clear, unambiguous and sufficiently conspicuous in order to give proper notice to
the insured of the limits on the duty to defend.") Trailer Bridge's narrow definition of
these terms contradicts both Utah and Florida law. Simmons, 877 P.2d at 1258, Pet. for
Reh'g, Case No. 10-13913, 9/27/2011, p. 11.
In Rose Acre the Seventh Circuit, sub silentio, presumed Rose Acre was
advertising its compliance with United Egg Producers' ("UEP's") guidelines during
CNA's policy period as a member of the UEP. But Rose Acre was not a UEP member at
the time of the initial advertising within the pertinent policy period. The Seventh
Circuit's understanding of the facts are contradicted by those revealed in the record. Pet.
/orite/*g,CaseNo. 11:1599, ECF No. 40, 11/14/2011, p. 3. This Court can do better.
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While these factual errors call into question the outcome in Rose Acre (Pet. For Reh'g,
Case No. 11:1599, p. 3), the Court's findings distinguish that case from the present facts
because Admiral cannot dispute that the involved slogans were "of another" and not from
Basic Research's marketing director.
In Trailer Bridge and Rose Acre the courts also ignored persuasive authority
decided under Utah law:
Certainly Edizone has alleged "use" of those advertising ideas
in the Cloud Nine Defendants' advertisements. . . . Edizone
alleges a claim under the Utah Truth in Advertising Act,
which specifically requires allegations of deceptive trade
practices occurring in advertising. "The purpose of [the Utah
Truth in Advertising Act] is to prevent deceptive, misleading,
and false advertising practices and forms in Utah." Utah
Code Ann. § 13-11 a-1. Clearly, the crux of a cause of action
for violation of the Utah Truth in Advertising Act is
advertising.
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cloud Nine, LLC, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1167, 1168 (D. Utah
2006); Wozniak Travel, Inc., 762 N.W.2d at 580 (travel company's use of term "Hobbit"
to describe its travel agency capitalized on good will surrounding Tolkien's literary
works, so alleged false advertising using that phrase fell within policy); Ohio Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Alters Med., Inc., No. 03-1037-CV-W-ODS, 2005 WL 2319820, at *4 (W.D. Mo.
Sept. 22, 2005) (pharmaceutical company's use of "Lipitor" to describe its cholesterolreducing drug alleged to unfairly compete with legitimate producer of same, Pfizer,
triggered false advertising coverage).
B.

An Offense (f) "Advertising Idea" is Not Limited to a Claimant's
"Advertising Idea"

Admiral's policy also does not require that the "advertising idea" originate with
the underlying claimant, as federal appellate courts have found. American Simmental
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Ass n v. Coregis Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 582, 588 (8th Cir. (Neb.) 2002) (challenged "fullblood" cattle designation "advertising idea" did not originate with claimants); Native
American Arts, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. (111.) 2006)
("Indian-made" "advertising idea" did not originate with claimant).
Construing the predecessor "misappropriation of advertising ideas" policy
language, the Ninth Circuit could not "discern any contextual, public-policy, or logical
significance to who owns the legal rights to the advertising idea in question." Hyundai
Motor Am. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 600 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir.
(Cal.) 2010). Here too, Admiral's "use" language lacks such "significance." The policy
covers an insured's "advertising idea . . . use" and coverage is not limited to the insured's
origination of an "idea."
As this court recently reaffirmed in U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States Sports
Spec. Assn., 2012 UT 3,1J14,

P.2d

, 2012 WL 192793, Utah courts will not

rewrite insurance policies under the guise of policy construction. There is no basis to
substitute more narrow policy language than that used by Admiral under the guise of
interpretation.
Trailer Bridge, 657F.3datll43 articulated and applied a "concept about the
manner the product is promoted" as the definition for "advertising idea." In doing so the
appellate court disregarded its prior broader definition ("any idea or concept related to the
promotion of a product to the public"), without explanation. Hyman v. Nationwide Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 304 F.3d 1179, 1188 (11th Cir. (Fla.) 2002). Trailer Bridge thereby failed
to follow its own precedent and disregarded fundamental Florida insurance coverage law
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principles. Creative Hospitality Ventures, Inc. v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 655 F.
Supp. 2d 1316, 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2009) ("[An insurer] cannot ask the court to re-write the
policy for [them] under the guise of policy construction."). This Court cannot reach
Trailer Bridge's result without similarly disregarding stare decisis and ignoring Utah's
identical prohibition on rewriting policies. Alfv. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d
1272, 1275 (Utah 1993).
Similarly, Rose Acre's analysis of the Policy term "of another" differs from Utah's
approach. The conclusion that "animal husbandry" concerns were not alleged as a
pretext for higher egg prices "in any of the 353 paragraphs of the antitrust complaint" is
based on an overly restrictive reading of the underlying fact allegations and was contrary
to the district court's factual findings:
One of the ways that plaintiffs allege that Rose Acre . . .
[was] able to conceal their anti-competitive activity was by
falsely representing that the reduced egg supply and higher
prices were "as a result of husbandry concerns.'
Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 772 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1001 (S.D. Ind. 2011)
affd on narrower grounds, Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 662 F. 3d 765
(7th Cir. 2011). The court also failed to consider the Internet pages provided to the
insurer which pre-dated Rose Acre's joining UEP and that the district court quoted in
Rose Acre, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 1002, n.8:
Eggs from the "free roaming" farms cost much more than
regular eggs because the eggs must be gathered by hand from
the indi victual hen's nest.
Concerns with the factual approach of the appellate court, however, do not
overcome the reality that the facts of this case differ. Here, the promotional campaign the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16

insured adopted cannot be treated as if created by Basic Research's own marketing
director or retained advertising agency.
Rose Acre fs error is also highlighted when considering other Policy provisions that
exclude only some forms of "false advertising." Exclusion (g), which eliminates certain
forms of "false advertising" for "failure to conform to representations of quality or
performance," reveals that coverage for other forms of false advertising is contemplated.
Were this not so, the exclusion from coverage for some types of advertising would be
unnecessary.
This logic is buttressed by elementary insurance business principles. Construing
"of another" to mean "advertising ideas" that the insured did not originate poses a
diminished actuarial risk. Insurers need not insure against newly-created advertising
concepts whose originality may generate litigation disputes, as is true of those in the
"advertising" business falling within exclusion (j)(l).
Rose Acre also failed to consider or address: (1) the possibility that under Indiana
law the term "of another" might be ambiguous in this context; or (2) how the policy
"construed as a whole" unambiguously restricts "of another's" meaning to "of a
claimant." Pet. for Reh g, Case No. 11:1599, p. 9. Rose Acre's analysis is therefore
inconsistent with Utah law. Taylor v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 925 P.2d 1279, 1282
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("An ambiguity may arise because the parties may attach two or
more feasible meanings to a policy's term.... If policy language is ambiguous, the
ambiguity is resolved against the insurer."). Rose Acre could only be correct if the policy
language was: "misappropriation of the claimants' advertising idea in your
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'advertisement' " and misappropriation were limited to a "wrongful taking" other than
"misuse."
Here too, Admiral's Policy does not state "of a competitor" or "of another but not
of a co-defendant," nor does it disqualify "ideas" of "another" who may be an alleged coconspirator. The Policy term is "of another's" - without the express limitation Admiral
seeks to impose. To duplicate Rose Acre's error of rewriting Admiral's Policy in the
guise of construction would be to disregard Utah law. Alf, 850 P.2d at 1275.
Arguing for its preferred narrow meaning of "another," Admiral also asserts that
Western Holdings, affiliated with Basic Research, cannot be deemed "another." But
Admiral fails to dispute or refute that "another" can reasonably mean (and thus under
Utah law must be deemed to include) numerous other prior users of the advertised
phrases at issue, as identified by the Federal Trade Commission. [OB 34-35] Admiral
"concedes [the] point by [its] failure to address it in [its] opposition brief." Misner v.
Potter, 2:07-CV-330 TS, 2008 WL 410128, at *3 (D. Utah Feb. 12, 2008).
C.

"Advertising Ideas" are not Limited to Misappropriation

Although Rose Acre presumed that the personal and advertising injury offense of
"use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement'" is limited to a single readilydefinable tort, no such tort exists. "What is important is . . . whether that conduct as
alleged in the complaint is at least arguably within one or more of the categories of
wrongdoing that the policy covers." Curtis-Universal Inc. v. Sheboygan Emerg. Med.
Servs., Inc., 43 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir. (Wis.) 1994).
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Rose Acre also failed to acknowledge or appreciate the significance of the
different meanings of "use" and "misappropriation." A wrongful "use" or misuse not
"wrongful taking" is implicated. Application of a narrow tort label for the "use of
another's" offense contravenes Indiana law and would contravene Utah law. Pet. for
ite/fg, Case No. 11:1599, p. 5.
Federal pleading rules lead to the same conclusion. DISH Network Corp. v. Arch
Specialty Ins. Co., 659 F.3d 1010,1015-16 (10th Cir. (Colo.) 2011):
Insurers have 'a heavy burden to overcome in avoiding the
duty to defend, such that the insured need only show that the
underlying claim may fall within policy coverage; the insurer
must prove it cannot.' . . . This liberal approach recognizes
the reality that 'notice pleading does not contemplate detail
and specificity,' . . . and a complaint may initially 'lack detail
necessary to conclusively establish the duty[.]
D.

Admiral's Other Cases Are Readily Distinguishable

Other cases cited by Admiral add nothing of substance to the analysis. Clarcor,
Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., No. 3:10-00336, 2010 WL 5211607 , at *12-13 (M.D. Tenn.
Dec. 16, 2010) involved an extraordinarily narrow construction of "advertising idea"
which Admiral argues if applied here would not trigger the "use of another's advertising
idea in your 'advertisement'" offense. [Appellee's Brief, pp. 24-26] Admiral is mistaken
because the law governing the insurance policy in dispute in Clarcor substantively differs
from Utah law.
Curiously, the Clarcor court cited no Tennessee decisional law (even though that
law was held to govern the policy) but only Sorbee Int'l Ltd. v. Chubb Custom Ins. Co.,
735 A.2d 712, 714 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999). The Clarcor court narrowly construed
"advertising idea" as:"[A]n idea for advertising that is 'novel and new,' and 'definite and
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concrete,' such that it is capable of being identified as having been created by one party
and stolen or appropriated from another." Clarcor, 2010 WL 5211607, at *12. The
Clarcor court then found the coverage offense not triggered by the underlying competitor
plaintiffs underlying allegations that the insured was advertising its competing goods
with packaging designs, colors and a rating system similar to the claimant's on the
grounds these things were not "novel." Id.
Clarcor thereby improperly limited the offense to the narrowest tort that could fall
within its ambit - common law misappropriation. See Riese v. QVC, Inc., No. CIV. A.
97-40068, 1999 WL 178545, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 1999) (common law
misappropriation limited to marketing technique that is "novel," "new" and "concrete.").
But "[T]ort law principles do not control judicial construction of insurance contracts . . . "
Creative Hospitality Ventures, Inc. v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 655 F.Supp. 2d 1316,
1329 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
Clarcor is unpersuasive because Tennessee and Pennsylvania law are inconsistent
with Utah law, which does not narrowly construe terms not defined in an insurance
policy. In Cloud Nine, 464 F.Supp. 2d at 1166 (applying Utah law) the District of Utah
found that ordinary product trade names are "advertising ideas" because broadly
construing the involved terms, the "plain and ordinary meaning of 'advertising idea'
generally encompasses 'an idea for calling public attention to a product or business,
especially by proclaiming desirable qualities so as to increase sales or patronage.'" Other
courts have construed the term identically, American Simmental Ass 'n, 282 F.3d at 587
(applying Montana law), or more broadly as "any idea or concept related to the
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promotion of a product to the public." Hyman v. Nationwide Mut, Fire Ins, Co,, 304 F.3d
1179, 1188 (11th Cir.(Fla.) 2002). Admiral suggests no reason why the terms in its
policy should be construed narrowly as in Clarcor rather than as construed in Cloud Nine
or Hyman. Basic Research's advertising slogans fall well within an "advertising idea."
Welch Foods v, Natfl Union Fire Ins. Co., Civ. Action No. 09-12087-RWZ, 2010
WL 3928704 (D. Mass. 2010), affd, Welch Foods v. National Union Fire Co, of
Pittsburgh, 659 F.3d 191, 193 (1st Cir. (Mass.) 2011) is similarly inapposite. An
insured's advertisements for its "pomegranate juice" were alleged by a competitor to be
false because the juice actually was a blend of juices, not pure pomegranate juice. With
Clarcor-like narrowness, Welch limited the meaning of "advertising idea" to "the manner
in which one advertises its goods and does not include the content of such advertising,"
then found no potential coverage. Id, at *4.
Welch's narrow definition of "advertising idea" was not based on applicable
Massachusetts law but derived from a string-citation to Accessories Biz, Inc, v. Linda and
Jay Keane, Inc, 533 F. Supp. 2d 381, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), which asserted the definition
adopted in J,A. Brundage Plumbing & Roto-Rooter, Inc, v. Massachusetts Bay Ins, Co,,
818 F. Supp. 553 (W.D.N.Y. 1993), vacated by reason of settlement, 153 F.R.D. 36
(W.D.N.Y. 1994). The Brundage definition clarified why certain trademark claims could
fall within a proposed definition of the distinct term "misappropriation of advertising
ideas" - an offense different from the "use of another's advertising idea" offense at issue
here. But Brundage neither stated nor suggested that its "advertising idea" definition
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was intended to apply to other offenses, nor to limit the scope of available definitions in
other contexts like those presented in Miller, Tompkins and Forlenza.
Clarcor, Welch and Accessories Biz each inaccurately and too-narrowly construed
"advertising idea." But such construction is contrary to Utah's broad policy construction
principles. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Assoc, v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1993)
("[IJnsurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured . . . so as to
promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance."). Applying this principle here, this
Court should construe "advertising idea" with the breadth articulated in Cloud Nine,
American Simmental and Hyman and, so applying the term, find potential coverage.
IV.

EXCLUSION (G) DOES NOT BAR A DEFENSE
Admiral bears the burden of proving its Policy's Exclusion (g) - "'personal and

advertising injury' arising out of the failure of goods . . . to conform with any statement
of quality or performance made in your 'advertisement'" - "clearly" bars a defense. LDS
Hosp., a Div. of Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857,
859 (Utah 1988). To do so, Admiral must overcome the "general presumption . . . to the
effect that that which is not clearly excluded from the operation of [an insurance] contract
is included[.]" Id.
Admiral fails to meet its burden. Clarcor, supra, 2010 WL 5211607, at *13-14
found the "failure to conform" exclusion applicable on distinguishable grounds. There,
specific false advertising comparing the underlying claimant's and the insureds'
competing products was alleged. The advertisements there at issue expressly focused the
insured's product's "quality" and "performance" - "Purolator's claim of "97% overall
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filtration efficiency." Clarcor, 2010 WL 5211607, at *3. But as previously explained
[OB 45-50], such facts are not alleged in Miller, Tompkins or Forlenza.
Westfieldlns. Co. v. Robinson Outdoors, Inc., Civil No. 10-151 (JRT/JJG), 2011
WL 5593171 (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 2011) (presently appealed to the Eighth Circuit) also
analyzed the "failure to conform" exclusion in a manner inconsistent with Utah and
Minnesota law, under which "[w]here multiple claims are present" Admiral can escape
its duty to defend only by showing "that no single claim . .. arguably [falls] within the
scope of coverage." AMCO Ins. Co. v. Inspired Technologies, Inc., 648 F.3d 875, 880
(8th Cir. (Minn.) 2011) - an appellate decision that reversed District Judge Tunheim
(who decided Robinson, 2011 WL 5593171, on which Admiral heavily relies) because
extrinsic evidence disposing of some otherwise-covered claims based on the insured's
intentional misconduct did not dispose of other claims in which negligent misconduct
liability outside the policy's exclusion could be found.
Robinson also incorrectly decided that an insured's licensed use of an "advertising
idea" does not trigger potential coverage even though such allegations evidence the
parties' mutually independent legal status, thereby vitiating the notion that the advertising
idea is not "of another." 2011 WL 5593171, at *7.
Admiral argues that the underlying claims' "essence" is that claimants "bought the
product, took it as directed and didn't lose weight." [AB 44] But self-serving
characterizations based on inaccurate paraphrasing cannot supplant the actual underlying
allegations which, as Section I above establishes, support damages resulting from
Akavar's purchase - not from its failure to perform. Since there are facts pled in at least
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one claim in each underlying lawsuit that are beyond Exclusion (g)'s scope, the exclusion
does not bar a defense to any of the lawsuits. Inspired Technologies, 648 F.3d at 883.
Basic Research has established why Admiral cannot meet its burden. [OB 45-50]
As shown in Section I, supra, the offense at issue ("use of another's advertising idea in
your 'advertisement' ") is not alleged to "arise out o f any such "failure to conform" to
any statement. Again, that is because the claimants allege a plaintiff class and its
members' entitlement to damages because they "purchased" Akavar, not because they
tried it and it did not work as advertised.
Admiral's criticism of Basic Research for "parsing" dictionary definitions of
words to ascertain the exclusion's meaning is baffling. Utah courts consult lay
dictionaries to understand non-defined insurance policy terms as a reasonable lay insured
would understand them. Cypress Plateau Min. Corp. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 972 F.
Supp. 1379, 1384 (D. Utah 1997) ("Ordinarily, a dictionary is a valuable resource for
[insurance policy] interpretation."); Rasmussen v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 393 P.2d
333, 337 (Utah 1964). As Basic Research predicted, [OB 46-47] Admiral offers no
different definitions of Exclusion (g)'s terms than the dictionary definitions Basic
Research provides.
Total CallIntl., Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 4th 161, 172 (Cal. App.
2010) requires no different result. There, the insured's competitors alleged the insured's
phone cards did not provide the number of call minutes advertised. Exclusion (g) applied
because a covered offense (implied "disparagement" of competitors' phone cards)
allegedly "arose out o f the phone cards' "failure to conform" to their advertised quality.
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For the same reason the exclusion applied in the other cases cited in Admiral's lengthy
Total Call quotation. [AB 34-35]
But where (as here) the offense allegedly "arises out o f something other than the
products' actual efficacy (e.g., the "goods" were purchased without regard to whether
they worked as advertised), the exclusion is not triggered. Infor Global Solutions
(Michigan), Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 686 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1007-08 (N.D.
Cal. 2010) (exclusion inapplicable because lawsuit for implied defamation of competitor
through negative comparison of insured's and competitor's products in insured's
advertisements had nothing to do with whether the insured's own products possessed
their advertised attributes).
Nor do the cases cited in Total Call on which Admiral relies support its
arguments. In Skylink Technologies, Inc. v. Assurance Co., 400 F.3d 982, 984 (7th Cir.
(111.) 2005), the insured falsely advertised its garage door opener controls were
compatible with a competitor claimant's garage door openers. The court found the
infringement was not caused by advertising that created colorable liability but rather the
manufacture, use and sale of the infringing product. Unlike here, the underlying claimant
failed to mention any specific advertisements in its lawsuit. Given those underlying
allegations the court held that merely posting a manual on a website and employee
recommendations that customers obtain additional product information from it did not
constitute advertising.
In New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Power-O-Peat, Inc., 907 F.2d 58, 58-59 (8th Cir.
(Minn.) 1990), coverage was denied because a competitor's allegations that the insured
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mislabeled its manure's contents triggered a policy exclusion for: "incorrect description
or mistake in advertised price of good[s] . . . advertised" - an exclusion different from
Admiral's "failure to conform" exclusion. In stark contrast, here claimants seek damages
"arising out o f their advertisement of a product, not because the product did not conform
to statements about it.
Superperformance Int'l, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 203 F. Supp. 2d 587, 589590 (E.D. Va. 2002) is equally unpersuasive. There, a competitor sued the insured
manufacturer of sports cars and related products for infringing the "Shelby" and "Cobra"
trademarks. A defense was denied primarily because the "first publication exclusion"
(inapplicable here) barred a defense. It was also held that Exclusion (g) barred a defense
to any "false advertising" claim. But that bare conclusion was unsupported by
discussion, analysis or explanation. Superperformance is not applicable where, as here, a
competitor is not suing and a mark is not at issue.
Moreover, Admiral's interpretive theory broadly construes this exclusion in
contravention of Utah law. An exclusion must bar a defense in all possible worlds.
Jewelers Mut. Ins. v. Milne Jewelry Co., No. 2:06-CV-243 TS, 2006 WL 3716112, at *3
(D. Utah Dec. 14, 2006) (unpublished) (Exclusion (g) ambiguous as applied to "Navajo
Jewelry"); Elcom, 991 F. Supp. at 1298 (Exclusion (g) inapplicable where product not
alleged to rise to level advertised in terms of "quality or performance.").
V.

CONCLUSION
For all the above reasons Judge Dever's ruling should be reversed and Admiral

found to owe a defense to Plaintiffs in the Miller, Tomkins and Forlenza actions. This
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case should be remanded to quantify Basic Research's damages and prejudgment interest,
and for entry of judgment requiring Admiral to defend Basic Research in the ongoing
consolidated Miller/Tompkins case.

Dated: February 7, 2012
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